Being "a Good Animal": Adorno, Posthumanism, and International Relations by Hobden, S. & Hobden, S.
Being “a Good Animal”: Adorno, Posthumanism and International Relations 
 
Stephen Hobden 
 
University of East London 
UK 
 
E-mail: s.c.hobden@uel.ac.uk 
 
Abstract: 
This article examines the potential contribution of the work of Theodor Adorno to the 
development of a posthuman analysis of international relations. Despite a recent blossoming 
of “Adorno studies,” his writings on nature, particularly his concerns regarding human 
relations with other species, have received comparatively little attention. The article argues 
that many of the central concerns driving the recent development of posthuman analyses of 
international relations overlap with some of Adorno’s core preoccupations. In Dialectic of 
Enlightenment in particular, much concern is directed at the perceived disenchantment with 
nature and the impacts of this disenchantment both on human relations with the rest of nature, 
but also with inter-human relations. Adorno’s focus on the attention to suffering being the 
“condition for all truth” is not restricted simply to the human and coincides with the ethical 
concerns of posthuman approaches. Finally, whilst it has been claimed that Adorno’s work, 
especially his notion of the totally administered society, leads to a political impasse, it will be 
suggested here that recent work by Fabian Freyenhagen on the practical elements of 
Adorno’s philosophy suggest that our priority, rather than living rightly, should be on “living 
less wrongly.” 
 
Keywords 
 
Adorno, posthumanism, international relations theory, inter-species relations, suffering, 
Critical Theory 
  
 
  
Being “a Good Animal”: Adorno, Posthumanism and International Relations 
 
Stephen Hobden 
 
“What's driving there in the car and sticking out its long trunk? 
Its a mammoth, its a mammoth, and its driving home”1 
 
Introduction 
The photograph of Theodor Adorno from 1943 is somewhat surprising. The “theory eating 
dialectical monster”2 is seated at his desk, half-turned towards the camera and has a smirk on 
his face. The desk is decorated with figures of giraffes, gazelles and horses. Towards the top 
of the desk is a stuffed teddy bear, while to his side is a statue of two peacocks.3 These 
animals share the workspace of the “last genius.”4 Yet this image of the writer, described by 
Alan How, as an “old sourpuss,”5 surrounded by animal companions is not out of keeping 
with the role of the animal world in his life. His closest friends and family were all given 
animal identities. Adorno himself was Archibald, the King of the hippopotamuses. Gretel, his 
wife was the “Giraffe,” while Max Horkheimer, another of the behemoths of the early 
Frankfurt School and Adorno's sometime writing companion was, of course, the mammoth 
referred to in the song cited at the start of this article.  
 
Adorno's attribution of animal characteristics to his family and close friends was not simply a 
reflection of the memories that he had of visiting Frankfurt Zoo as a child with his mother 
(hippo mare) and Aunt Agatha (tigress), it is also an indication of the role of nature and inter-
species relations played in his work. As an example of the scope of these ideas in an, 
admittedly jocular, letter to Horkheimer, Adorno talked about the writing of a “theoretical 
groundwork of a human society that includes the animals.”6  
 
That the exploitative character of human relations with nature is a key feature of Horkheimer 
and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment has been frequently commented on. This article 
intends to take the analysis of Adorno's views on the relations between human and non-
human nature further, in order to explore what Derrida described as the “least trodden” and 
potentially most significant of any future appreciation of Adorno's work.7 As Christina 
Gerhardt indicates, non-human animals play an important part in Adorno’s thinking: our 
relationship with the non-human world “consistently highlights the inhumanity of humans... 
Animals remind us that nature for Adorno is not only the condition of possibility for reading 
the self, humans and culture but also for radically questioning the concept of otherness and 
our relationship to it.”8 The purpose of my investigation is to evaluate Adorno's work as a 
possible source of ideas and praxis for a posthuman approach to the understanding of 
international relations. As such this article reflects the growing interest in Adorno's work 
within international relations,9 philosophy and political theory.10 The bulk of this more recent 
work rejects the view, derived from Habermas, that the argument of Horkheimer and Adorno 
in Dialectic of Enlightenment leads political thinking into an impasse.11 Instead most of this 
literature suggests that Adorno's work has much to offer in terms of epistemology and an 
ethics that speaks to the current era and the particular problems that we now confront. 
 
However any attempt to engage with Adorno's thought should not underestimate the 
difficulties involved in such an endeavor. The early Frankfurt school writers were very clear 
that theory was historically and geographically specific, and that wholesale lifting and 
application of theory to different circumstances as a transcendent template was not effective. 
However this does not mean that we should ignore the valuable insights from writers from 
other eras when their comments resonate with our current circumstances; and it has been the 
argument of many recent discussions that Adorno's work has much to contribute to an 
understanding of contemporary issues. While he did not use the term specifically, I will argue 
that there is much in Adorno's discussion of relations between human and non-human nature 
that prefigures current discussions of posthumanism.  
 
Those who wish to engage with Adorno are also confronted by his approach to writing. 
Adorno adopted an allusive style which, intentionally, avoided simple summary or 
conclusion. His later works “are written at the limits of German syntax.”12 Furthermore, he 
was reluctant to provide explicit definitions of his terminology for fear that this would 
contribute to a reification of these ideas. For the non-German speaker, this problem is 
compounded by the need to study his work in translation. These issues are not easily 
resolved, although some of the problems can be alleviated to an extent. As well as the more 
“difficult” books, Adorno did also produce a number of lectures and radio discussions in 
which his intention was to offer a more direct insight into his perspective. These (along with 
the extensive secondary literature) can be used as a means of shining a light on the more 
complex discussions. 
 
My argument proceeds as follows: humans as a species have become separated 
(disenchanted) from the rest of nature, seeing the non-human world purely as means rather 
than ends. However this disenchantment (or development of instrumental reason) has had 
implications not only for human - non-human relations, but also intra-human relations. 
Furthermore, by seeing ourselves as separate and superior to the rest of what exists, we 
underestimate the contingency of our own existence. However the appropriate response does 
not lie in a re-enchantment: disenchantment is a process inherent in human development. 
What we need to “be a good animal” is a recognition of the embodied character of our 
existence, and to highlight suffering, not only within our own species, but across the species 
boundary.  
 
Human and non-human nature 
The relationship between human and non-human nature is a theme that runs throughout 
Adorno’s work from his earliest writings through to the posthumously published Aesthetic 
Theory.13 Eduardo Mendiata notes that, together with Derrida, Adorno maintained a 
“philosophical commitment to recognizing that we are inextricably woven into the natural 
history of all animals, and all that is living in general, even as we have sought to define 
ourselves by distinguishing ourselves from it.”14 
 
One of Adorno’s earliest lectures, “The Idea of Natural-History,” directly addresses this 
issue. This lecture, given to the Frankfurt chapter of the Kant Society, had as its purpose “to 
dialectically overcome the usual antithesis of nature and history,” to be replaced by a 
“concrete unity of nature and history.”15 Here Adorno appears to imply that all that exists is 
part of nature when he states that “for the question of ontology… is none other than what I 
mean by ‘nature.’”16 In other words there is nothing outside of nature. The lecture is a 
critique of phenomenology, in which, Adorno claims, there has been a dualism of nature and 
history, nature in this understanding being that which is outside of history. Instead there is an 
“insuperable interwovenness of natural and historical elements.”17 In order to understand the 
relationship between nature and history it is therefore necessary “to comprehend historical 
being in its most extreme historical determinacy, where it is most historical, as natural being, 
or if it were possible to comprehend nature as an historical being where it seems to rest most 
deeply in itself as nature.”18 More significantly, “all being, or everything existing is to be 
grasped as the interweaving of historical and natural being.”19 In other words there is no 
distinction or separation of the historical from the natural. Both are historical, and the view 
that nature is a world of constancy is for Adorno incorrect. Human society might be more 
deeply historicised, but nature (including human nature) is historically contingent.20  
 
The relationship between the human and the rest of nature is also a significant area of enquiry 
in Adorno’s later works. In a famous passage in Negative Dialectics Adorno states that “the 
traditional antithesis of nature and history is both true and false; true in so far as it expresses 
what the moment of nature underwent; false in so far as it apologetically recapitulates, by 
conceptual construction, history's concealment of its own natural outgrowth.”21 The human 
species has attempted to separate itself from nature (a point discussed below), but overlooks 
the inherent embeddedness of the human situation, which has been hidden by the attempt to 
separate the human from nature.  
 
How then does Adorno understand nature? This is to an extent a difficult question to answer, 
given that Adorno is reluctant to expressly define concepts. Hence his view that all our 
understandings of nature will be mediated, and partial. It is a central element of his view of 
negative dialectics that “objects do not go into concepts without leaving a remainder.”22 This 
is not to say that for Adorno there are no distinctive features of human society. There is an 
“external nature” in terms of the material world that surrounds us and an “internal nature” in 
the sense of our physical embodiment in the world. Yet, in Alison Stone’s words “we humans 
are also separate from nature inasmuch as we are distinctively cultural, historical beings; we 
have produced this separation ourselves, through our efforts to transcend nature.”23 It is to 
this separation from nature that I now turn. 
 
Nature Disenchanted 
Perhaps the most complete discussion of the emergence of a dualism between human and 
non-human nature is discussed in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
combined undertaking.24 Although this work is impossible to summarise succinctly, at its 
core is an argument about the development of instrumental reason. For Horkheimer, the 
features of instrumental reason “can be summarized as the optimum adaptation of means to 
ends, thinking as an energy conserving operation. It is a pragmatic instrument oriented to 
expediency, cold and sober.”25 Instrumental Reason emerges as a result of the human position 
within the natural world, a position of comparative disadvantage compared to the rest of 
nature. Humans could only survive and prosper through the development of a greater level of 
cunning. The need to control nature is underwritten by the “fear of the real overwhelming 
power of nature.”26 As such cunning was a reaction to a natural world that was seen as 
threatening that in response developed into a desire to dominate that world.27 At this point, 
according to Vogel “humans implicitly set up a radical distinction between the natural and 
the human realms.”28  
 
Horkheimer and Adorno draw on the myth of Odysseus to illustrate their argument. In order 
to ensure his own survival, in other words his self-preservation, Odysseus relied on his 
cunning. In his encounter with Polyphemus, Odysseus, by playing on a double meaning of 
the Greek word for nobody, saves both himself and his men from being eaten by the Cyclops. 
Yet the price he pays in doing is to separate himself from the rest of nature. 
 
Horkheimer and Adorno use this myth to illustrate their larger point, that through the use of 
cunning humans have separated themselves from the rest of nature. What it means to separate 
the human from the rest of nature was the “extirpation of animism.”29 As Horkheimer and 
Adorno argue “Throughout European history the idea of the human being has been expressed 
in contradistinction to the animal. The latter’s lack of reason is the proof of human dignity.”30 
That which is “animal” and without reason, becomes the standard by which the human 
species claims its superiority and right to domination. 
 
The need to promote one’s own self-preservation is a complex issue however. Self-
preservation is an element of our animal being, and in pursuing our own self-preservation we 
reveal our animal characteristics.31 This cannot be split off from our animal self. Hence 
Adorno argues that rationality “cannot, any more than the subjective authority serving it, the 
ego, be simply split off from self-preservation.”32 In other words, rationality is as much a 
reflection of our animal being as is the drive to self-preservation. Adorno does not seek to 
minimise or overcome these elements in us as a species, but for human animals, a first step to 
freedom from such drives would be to acknowledge their natural/animal aspects. As 
summarised by Cook “to be mindful of nature, we must acknowledge that reason developed 
as an adaptive response to the threats that the environing world posed to our survival, or that 
the trajectory of reason has been determined by instinctually driven relations with nature.”33 
Adorno also acknowledges that we now have the technical capability to fulfil those needs for 
self-preservation for the entire species, so no longer have a need to be dominated by such 
instincts.34 Yet this self-preservation drive has culminated, through a desire to dominate 
nature, in the suppression of that very animal quality that self-preservation implies. We have 
turned ourselves into the “other” of nature, whereas we are inseparable from the rest of 
nature. Ultimately for “Horkheimer and Adorno, reason emerges as the instrument of 
domination over nature, inner nature and finally social relations between people.”35  
 
This separation of the human from the rest of nature requires the denial of the nature that lies 
within the human. This separation has had a terrible cost both for the species, and for the rest 
of nature. For the human, the natural elements within (which Adorno calls internal nature), 
are suppressed. By supressing these elements, Adorno argues, we allow our instinct for self-
preservation to become ever more dominant and, as a result, we descend into a deeper 
irrationality. As Adorno notes, “reason will be self-preservation running wild and will regress 
to nature.”36 This process has a long history: “for thousands of years, human beings have 
largely sought to subjugate nature in the interest of their own survival, damaging (sometimes 
irremediably) both non-human nature and their own inner nature in the process.”37 Non-
human nature has been on the receiving end of an instrumental reason that has seen the rest of 
nature purely in terms of human ends without a consideration of the value or suffering in 
nature itself. Furthermore the application of instrumental reason to the rest of nature has been 
duplicated in human inter-relations. As Gerhardt notes: 
 
A logic that suppresses some or instrumentalizes others creates, according to 
Adorno and Horkheimer, a condition of possibility for the Holocaust. It is the 
hierarchy, by which humans are deemed superior by dint of their ability to reason, 
and animals are deemed inferior because of their inability to reason, that also 
concomitantly sets up a diametrically opposed relationship between the rational 
and the irrational, one that must be enforced at all costs.38  
 
In Dialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer and Adorno discuss in truly apocalyptic terms the 
outcome of this division from nature. “The denial of nature in the human,” which they 
describe as the “core of all civilizing rationality,” results in a “proliferating mythical 
irrationality.” When “human beings cut themselves off from nature” they undermine the very 
purposes, self-preservation for which that distinction was intended. The outcome is that “self-
preservation destroys the very thing that is to be preserved,” with even more ramifications for 
the species in that “the antireason of totalitarian capitalism, whose technique of satisfying 
needs… makes the satisfaction of needs impossible and tends towards the extermination of 
humanity.”39  
 
The immediate form that these negative outcomes take is in the persistence of suffering. 
Suffering not only in the human community, but, it will be argued here, across the species 
boundary. 
 
Suffering 
Whilst suffering might be a concomitant part of lived existence, for the Frankfurt School 
thinkers a distinction could be made between “historically superfluous” and “historically 
necessary” forms of suffering. Whilst in previous eras suffering, due to, as an example, food 
shortages, may have been an inevitable part of life, in an era when it was technically possible 
to provide for the needs of all on the planet, the failure to do that was an indication of 
superfluous suffering that required investigation. Hence “the main object of their theoretical 
interest was the continued existence of superfluous suffering in a world in which it could 
actually be abolished.”40  
 
Writing in the shadows cast by the Holocaust, or for Adorno “Auschwitz”, and the failed 
social experiment that comprised Stalinism, it is no surprise that the issue of suffering was an 
issue that runs through Adorno’s work. It should provide a focus for attention because “to 
lend a voice to suffering is a condition for all truth.”41 Historical progress, and in particular 
the possibility of fulfilling basic human needs has not contributed to a diminution of 
suffering; if anything human suffering has perhaps become intense with modernity, as 
evidenced by the death camps and the gulag. A voice needs to be given to this suffering 
because “perennial suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has to 
scream.”42 That we know pain is wrong is clear from our own personal reactions to pain. Pain 
is something that we would rather avoid. In Adorno’s words we experience a “practical 
abhorrence of the unbearable physical agony to which individuals are exposed.”43 Pain is 
something that we prefer to avoid. It tells us something about the way things are. The focus 
here is on the very much on the physical experience of pain. This bodily experience is very 
much an indication that “tells our knowledge that suffering ought not to be, that things should 
be different.”44  
 
Auschwitz, Adorno argues had imposed on humanity a new prime directive: to ensure that 
such events should not happen again.45 And a focus on the suffering in the camps was 
important as a reminder of what was possible, and what humanity should strive to avoid. The 
purpose of such a focus on past events of suffering is to work, above all, against a 
“forgetfulness that too easily goes along with and justifies what is forgotten.”46  
 
Such a concern with suffering does not end at the species boundary. In Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno write in explicit terms of the suffering of animals in 
animal experiments, indicating a clear disapproval of such endeavors. Results from 
experiments are extracted “without restraint from defenceless animals in their abominable 
physiological laboratories.” Conclusions are drawn from “mutilated animal bodies.” 
“Humans possess reason” which is applied without pity for “the animals from which they 
draw their bloody conclusions.”47 In one of his lecture courses, Adorno, agreeing with 
Schopenhauer, argues that “the establishment of total rationality as the supreme objective 
principle of mankind might well spell the continuation of that blind domination of nature 
whose most obvious and tangible expression was to be found in the exploitation and 
maltreatment of animals.”48  
 
Furthermore, there may be a direct link between these forms of mistreatment of non-human 
species with the abuse of fellow humans. Hence “Auschwitz begins wherever someone looks 
at a slaughterhouse and thinks they're only animals.”49 There are parallels here to the 
tendency to compare other social groups to animals in some form or another that has justified 
colonialism, and genocide. Adorno drew attention to this trend when he argued that “the 
constantly encountered assertion that savages, blacks, Japanese are like animals, monkeys for 
example, is the key to the pogrom.”50  
 
Andrew Linklater has recently pointed to the overlap between moral considerations across 
species boundaries being linked to concerns within the human community. He argues that 
“the assault on ‘speciesism’ - the doctrine that human distress has greater intrinsic moral 
significance than animal  suffering - is part of a larger challenge to the insider-outsider 
dualisms, or ‘established-outsider relations,’ that have legitimated inflicting pain and 
suffering in relations within and between communities.”51 Adorno, Gerhardt observes, 
suggests that a concern with animal suffering will contribute to a greater awareness of the 
repressed animal characteristics of the human species.52  
 What then would a focus on non-human animal suffering imply? Clearly we have plenty to 
discuss if we want to turn our attention of our fellow species, whether that is the slaughter 
house, laboratory (both of which are identified by Adorno), or in the sixth extinction,53 which 
Adorno may have intuited, but was not aware of directly. Certainly at the time of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno were aware of the threats to non-human nature when 
they observed that “the whole ingenious machinery of modern industrial society is no more 
than nature dismembering itself.”54 According to Alison Stone, things suffer when “their 
needs to develop spontaneously” are “thwarted.”55 By this definition, the very high rates of 
extinction (far beyond the expected background rates that would be expected) indicate that 
nature is suffering very significantly. Focusing on the suffering of the species with which we 
share the planet should not only be an antidote for human separation from nature. To think in 
such instrumental terms would return us to a point made by Kant, of which Adorno was 
highly critical, that humans should not exert undue oppression on non-human animals, but 
only because this unkindness might be replicated in our relations with our fellow humans. 
Instead, non-human “perennial” suffering also has as a right to expression in its own right, 
together with the suffering of human beings. 
 
But how might such suffering be overcome? It is a commonplace that Adorno’s work offers 
little in the way of resolution to these issues. Yet much of the recent focus on his writing has 
indicated that, despite the difficulties in bringing about change, Adorno does offer some 
glimpses of how alternatives might be generated.   
 
Reconciliation 
Humans then have used reason as a way of distancing themselves from the rest of nature, and 
this separation has been a central element of western thought. In this sense we are confronted 
by two sets of problems, the way that we think about the rest of nature, and the way that we 
have repressed the natural elements within us. As a result, “preponderant external nature 
always lies beyond our conceptual grasp, preponderant internal nature eludes our attempts to 
repress it.”56 This internal and external distancing has allowed humans to develop the 
(erroneous) belief that they are in some way separated from the rest of nature. While Adorno 
depicts the emergence of reason as a uniquely human attribute, an issue that is certainly open 
to question,57 his arguments about the impact of instrumental reason on human and non-
nature remain valid regardless of whether we regard rationality as a uniquely human 
characteristic or not.  As we saw in the last section, for Adorno the development of this 
perception of separation has been disastrous both for humans and for the rest of nature. Yet, 
in what may at first seem paradoxical, is a completely natural development. The human drive 
for self-preservation which, in Adorno’s account is the explanation for the emergence of 
consciousness and reason is very much a part of nature. As Adorno notes, “the suppression of 
nature for human ends is a mere natural relationship, which is why the supremacy of nature-
controlling reason and its principle is an illusion.”58 Given this view, that self-preservation, 
the force which appears to be driving us towards disaster, is entirely nature, how can it be 
possible to avert the looming catastrophe? 
 
Drawing upon Adorno for an exit plan is confronted by two difficulties. Firstly there is the 
commonly held view that Adorno is ultimately deeply pessimistic about the human situation 
under late capitalism, and that his writings offer no possibilities for the amelioration of our 
situation. Furthermore, Adorno was quite clear that he was not going to offer a political 
programme, fearing that to do so would contribute further to the reification of society. 
Without a doubt Adorno is deeply pessimistic about the human condition. However, rather 
than taking this as a statement that positive change is impossible, we could take it as an 
acknowledgement of the inherent difficulties that projects for progressive change confront. 
Given the history of projects which claimed to be aimed at human emancipation but ended in 
forms of barbarity, the problems confronting political projects should not be underestimated. 
And indeed, recent writers have unearthed more “practical” aspects to his work.59 
 
The notion of reconciliation is one that is a running theme throughout Adorno’s work. In 
relation to the rest of nature, this involves both a reconciliation, or rather acceptance of 
internal nature, and a reconciliation with external nature, or the environment in which we 
exist. With reference to internal nature, Adorno is again perhaps paradoxical. In order to gain 
“autonomy” from nature, humans need to accept their place as part of nature. For Adorno, 
Deborah Cook notes:    
Reconciliation with nature requires that individuals reflect on themselves as part 
of nature – both to acquire a better understanding of their dependence on nature, 
and to achieve a greater autonomy with respect to it. The ego will become more 
autonomous only when it recognizes that it Is not omnipotent, not completely 
master of its own house, but driven by impulses that it can neither dispense with 
nor eradicate.60  
 
It is only through an acceptance of the animal characteristics within, that we can ultimately 
capture our humanity. The attempt to repress animal characteristics is also a restriction on our 
humanity itself. Hence a recognition of nature, in the form of the other within will also 
“allow a recognition of the humanity, too.”61  
 
Central to this process is the development of critical thought, an activity that Adorno 
considered should be the core of educational practices. In his later work, and in particular 
lectures given on German radio, Adorno stressed the importance of education in developing a 
critical self-awareness. Adorno discusses education in two senses, first the work of teachers, 
and secondly more broadly in the sense of a more radical transformation of thinking 
processes within society.62 The latter can work towards the overcoming of the “coldness” that 
we require to survive in late capitalist society – a coldness that affects both our inter-human 
relations and our relations with other species.63 It is this coldness that allows large-scale 
human rights abuses and our maltreatment of other species. There is a problem in that it is 
“critical thought” which has brought us to the impasse that we have reached, in the sense that 
it is critical thought in the form of instrumental reason that has led to the human belief in 
domination both of non-human nature and inter-human relations. According to Stone, 
however it is possible to “say both that critical thought has always served domination and has 
been fundamentally shaped by this function (so that it is not simply a neutral form of thought 
which they can adopt unquestioningly), and that critical thought can, with vigilance, be 
employed in ways that gradually change its own hitherto existing status as a tool of self-
preservation.”64  
 
It is how this might be achieved that is the central concern of Negative Dialectics. Adorno is 
critical of the way that humans consider that our concepts capture the uniqueness of objects. 
This feature is particularly relevant in terms of the rest of nature, and it is our belief that 
concepts capture objects that is at the heart of our belief that we can control nature. The 
purpose of negative dialectics, or non-identarian thinking is to heighten our awareness of that 
remainder which our concepts do not capture. It is also to point out that the object has 
priority. For Adorno, it is “by passing to the object’s preponderance that dialectics is 
rendered materialistic.”65 The purpose of such an undertaking is to allow “critical reflection 
on our concepts [that] can make us palpably aware that our domination of nature is ethically 
wrong, an awareness which distances us from our pursuit of self-preservation and so alters 
the motivational background that shapes future exercises of critical thinking.”66  
 
In seeking a reconciliation with nature, both within and without, Adorno is not seeking a 
recovery of some form of pristine nature. Overcoming our exploitative relationship with 
nature will not turn back the clock to some previous stage because “there is no pristine inner 
nature awaiting release from repression.”67 External and internal nature have both been 
affected by the passage of time and the changing sets of social relations associated with late 
capitalism. Hence “neither inner nor outer nature subsists in a latent form untouched by 
history, which may one day be recuperated in its original prelapsarian state.”68 While humans 
have created a disenchantment with nature, identarian thought has produced a different form 
of enchantment. Hence in Dialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer and Adorno are “as critical 
of nature’s re-enchantment as of its disenchantment; this is because they believe that 
experiences of nature as enchanted are a necessary consequence of the modern intensification 
of disenchantment.”69 We can only change our relationship with the rest of nature from the 
position that we are now in, rather than set the clock back to some previous condition. 
 
In Negative Dialectics Adorno encourages maintaining a proximity to the “alien” whilst 
allowing the other to be distant and different.70 In other words to have a care and attention to 
that which is not us, while not attempting to constrain that which is different from us by 
identarian thought. As Wilford observes, “Adorno's normative contribution lies in the insight 
that persons and things do not fit perfectly together (in fact, their perfect equality would be 
the result of a violent oppression); between them is a space of nonidentity that once realized, 
encourages a humble critical distance and an openness to the radical Other.”71 It is through 
critical thought and such an openness that we may be able to transform the situation which 
we confront. 
 
To be a “good animal”: Negative Dialectics and Posthumanism in International 
Relations 
In a critique of Kantian morality, Adorno observes that “Kantian ethics – which accords 
affection, not respect to animals – can muster only disdain: to try to live so that one may 
believe himself to have been a good animal.”72 Discussing this somewhat cryptic comment, 
Christopher Menke notes that “the action stemming from a feeling of solidarity is the action 
of a ‘good animal.’”73 That Adorno chooses to use the term animal in this sense (rather than 
human) suggests that he wants to emphasize the embeddedness of the human within the rest 
of nature.   
 
There has been a recent interest in posthumanism within the discipline of international 
relations. While the term posthumanism is an equivocal one, and open to multiple 
definitions,74 the term is used here to indicate an approach to international politics that 
acknowledges the embedded character of human systems within multiple other animate and 
non-animate systems. This view highlights that human systems are co-dependent on 
interactions with other species. Such an approach is deeply influenced by complexity 
thinking and advocates a non-Newtonian approach to understanding the relationships 
between complex adaptive systems.75 While to subsume Adornian concerns and thinking 
within a posthuman approach would probably be an act of identarian thinking, bringing some 
of Adorno’s insights to bear on recent thinking within a posthuman framework could result in 
a positive outcome. 
 
From the discussion so far, it is clear that Adorno’s analysis is deeply embedded within a 
discussion of human/rest of nature relations. He considers the distancing of human relations 
from the rest of nature as both a mistake and potentially disastrous. Such a perspective takes a 
similar position to much of the recent literature on posthumanism. Whilst there has been less 
of a tendency to overlook internal nature, and in particular the disastrous impacts of 
attempting to repress this, there is an acknowledgement of the human as species of animal. A 
remarkable animal, but not in any sense unique. Donna Haraway has done much to draw 
attention to the challenges that have confronted human notions of exceptionalism, whether in 
Copernican astronomy, Darwin’s theory of evolution, Freudian psychology or the rise of 
cybernetics.76 All of these revelations have contributed to the challenge to the Western and 
enlightenment view that the human species stands apart from the rest of nature. While, as 
already noted, Adorno claimed that there was an element of exceptionalism in the human, 
with regard to the emergence of consciousness, this is an area that much in the way of 
posthumanist analysis would dispute. While various tests have been made to assess the 
rationality of non-human species, many of these tests reflect a human perception and priority 
on the world.   
 
By giving priority to the object, Adorno’s work can also be seen as a pre-cursor to the newly 
emerging field of “new materialism.”77 New materialism can be seen as reaction to the 
linguistic turn in the social sciences, bringing attention back, in part at least, to the material 
basis of existence. Likewise Adorno counselled the need to “break through the deception of 
constitutive subjectivity,” and the purpose of his negative dialectics was to do just that, in the 
same ways that new materialism also intends to bring back a concern with issues of matter.78 
 
Adorno, also is very concerned about the impacts of human activity on the rest of nature, 
seeing, rather presciently given his death in 1969, the possibility of environmental disaster 
having considerable threat for life on the planet in general. Adorno notes that “the complete 
reification of the world… is indistinguishable from an additional catastrophic event caused 
by human beings, in which nature has been wiped out and after which nothing more grows 
anymore.”79 While the claim that a future in which “nature has been wiped out” might be an 
overemphasis of human power, the point that Adorno is making reflects a concern, shared 
with much posthumanist writing about the negative impacts of human activity on the rest of 
nature.80  
 
Furthermore Adorno, both in his own writing, particularly in his work with Horkheimer 
provides us with an account of how this disastrous situation has come about. In fact their 
argument about relations between human and non-human nature is crucial to their arguments 
regarding the current situation of society. It was the attempts to master nature, driven by a 
need for self-preservation that has led to the development of a human drive to dominate other 
human beings, and the process of a separation from nature that has resulted in the disastrous 
suppression of both internal and external nature. This drive for self-preservation Adorno 
acknowledges is an entirely natural feature. However humanity has now reached the point 
where self-preservation is within our reach: humanity has the technological capacity to fulfil 
the needs of the entirety of the human population. However the drive to self-preservation is 
driving us on a path to ever greater acquisitiveness, thus pushing us into ever greater 
exploitation of the human and non-human systems within which we live. 
 Confronted by the totally reified, totally administered society might give one cause to give up 
hope of the emergence of a more rational society, however it is apparent that however 
pessimistic Adorno is about the human potential for avoiding disaster we should not 
ultimately despair.81 A reconciliation both with internal and external nature is possible. As 
with much of the posthumanist literature, Adorno stresses an acknowledgement of the human 
position within nature both internally as well as externally as the keystone to overcoming the 
current situation. Cook summarises this position as, “the dominators of nature are themselves 
dominated by nature because domination is impelled by nature itself in the form of the 
instinct for self-preservation. To advance beyond our current predicament… we must first 
acknowledge that what now counts as progress has become self-vitiating… the preservation 
of humanity requires the transformation of society.”82 
 
How then might one consider oneself to have been a “good animal”? In a recent discussion of 
what he calls Adorno’s Practical Philosophy Fabian Freyenhagen attempts to draw some 
elements of practice from Adorno’s thinking. His starting point is Adorno’s statement that 
“there is no right life within the wrong,” or as Freyenhagen states it, the “no right living 
thesis.”83  Freyenhagen’s interprets this in the customary way to mean that under capitalism it 
is not possible to live a full and moral life; we are all complicit with a system that is deeply 
unfair and exploitative. This does not mean that within this context that it is not possible to 
live more or less wrongly, and, given this, Freyenhagen explores the notion that we could aim 
to live less wrongly. 
 
What might living less wrongly comprise of? Freyenhagen points to various elements. First 
he points to Adorno’s discussion of living a “suspended life,” which he expands to take in the 
idea of “not to be at home in this world and life.”84 By this he means that we should maintain 
a distance from the world. This is not to absent ourselves from the world or undergo a total 
withdrawal. Such a withdrawal is also living wrongly, because it fails to challenge existing 
circumstances. Rather we should aim to consider our involvement in the world, and the 
extent to which our actions are complicit with a society that we perceive to be unjust, unequal 
and destructive of the rest of nature. While this may not result in a direct change to that 
system, and individually it is probably impossible to work such a transformation, 
“nonetheless, such a suspension is the only thing left to work for and a necessary condition 
for there being any change.”85  
 
A second element in terms of living less wrongly would be to consider the relevance of what 
Adorno described, in Negative Dialectics, as a new prime directive. This involved the 
responsibility on humanity to ensure that nothing akin to the holocaust be allowed to occur 
again. In terms of international relations, this suggest a clear focus on where the concerns of 
the discipline should lie, but given the concerns with the rest of nature I have discussed here 
it also be possible to expand this concern beyond the species level. As Calvin Thomas 
observes, “Adorno… calls for a reactivation of a fundamental human capacity – a capacity 
without which the word ‘human’ in the sense not of ‘humanist’ but of ‘humane’ could hardly 
apply: the capacity to suffer and to recognize the suffering of others.”86 
 
For Adorno, to expose suffering was a condition for speaking truthfully. Furthermore, he 
recognized that suffering was not only a concern within the human species. The writing 
discussed previously from Dialectic of Enlightenment, and his concern that when we think of 
animals led to the slaughterhouse as “only animals,” then it is clear that Adorno had concerns 
which extended across the species boundary.  
Conclusion 
This article makes the claim that Adorno provides an important resource for underpinning a 
posthuman account of international relations. His work is suffused with a concern and an 
analysis of human relations with the rest of nature, and signals the dangers of a continued 
disenchantment with nature. In his work with Horkheimer there is a significant analysis of the 
form in which the human divide from the rest of nature occurs, a feature of existence that 
Adorno laments in much of his later work. Adorno also signals the difficulties in reversing 
the form of society that has emerged, and his concerns about the limits on our actions in a 
totally administered society are ones that emancipatory projects need to be aware of. 
However, despite his reputation, Adorno does offer some glimpses that things could be 
otherwise:  that a reconciliation can occur both within the species and across the boundaries 
between the species of human nature. While wrong life cannot be lived rightly, there is the 
possibility for living less wrongly.  
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